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Abstract. When viewed at a certain coarse grain, the brain seems a relatively small dynamical
system composed by a few dozen interacting areas, performing a number of stereotypical behaviors.
It is known that, even relatively small dynamical systems can reliably generate robust and flexible
behavior if they are possed near a second order phase transition, because of the abundance of
metastable states at the critical point. The approach pursued here assumes that some of the most
fundamental properties of the functioning brain are possible because it is spontaneously possed at
the border of such instability. In this notes we review the motivation, the arguments and recent
results as well as the implications of this view of the functioning brain.
INTRODUCTION
Each year, there are several hundredths of fascinating discoveries of isolated aspects
of brain physiology. At the same time, only a handful or reports discusses the reverse
process: how the knowledge of isolated pieces can be integrated to explain how the
brain works. This is, of course, a well known, hard to tackle challenge which, however,
is particularly suitable to a physicist because of it inherent familiarity with ideas of
universality and unification. For a newcomer the first concern would be if it is possible to
approach the problem of brain function without inventing a new theoretical framework.
In other words, is it possible to gain any insight about relevant brain problems by
deliberately ignoring -at least for the moment- the soft aspects of brain’s condensed
matter?
The approach pursued here assumes that the most fundamental properties of the
functioning brain are possible because is spontaneously possed at the border of an
instability. Indeed the proposal is that these fascinating properties have no extra cost
as they are generic for this state. From this viewpoint, all human behaviors, including
thoughts, undirected or goal oriented actions, or simply any state of mind, are the
outcome of a dynamical system -the brain- at or near a critical state. The main point
is that, as in thermodynamics systems at the critical point, it is only at this state that
the largest behavioral repertoire can be attained by the smallest number of degrees of
freedom. Behavioral repertoire means the set of actions useful for the survival of the
brain and degrees of freedom means the number of (loosely defined) specialized brain
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areas engaged in generating such actions. By looking at the problem from this angle a
number of ideas and results from statistical physics can be used to guide work towards
the ultimate goal of understanding how the brain works, without inventing anything new.
This article is dedicated to discuss the basis and the implications of this proposition.
The paper is organized as follows. The second section introduces the main motivation,
which is routed in concepts borrowed from complex systems. For completeness we also
summarize here some obvious connections with very well known facts from statistical
physics. The third section discuss the specific rationale and the next section enumerates
evidence that seems to support the usefulness of this approach to brain function. The
paper closes with a short discussion of implications.
FUNDAMENTAL LAWS FOR THE COLLECTIVE
It is well known that almost all interesting macroscopic phenomena in nature, from
gravity to photosynthesis, from superconductivity to muscle contraction are product of
an underlying collective phenomena. In this sense, science is the never ending process
of explaining macroscopic phenomena observed at one level from fundamental laws
uncovered at another level. Neuroscience not being an exception, must explain human
behavior, i.e., what we see in terms of the underlying collective which is partially
hidden to us. If both phenomena and explanation remains at the same level then nothing
is different from the seventeen century understanding of what constituted conscious
experience (Figure 1). The main difficulty, and the concern of this proposal, is that there
no fundamental laws yet for the collective of neurons!
However, there are some relevant facts which could be source of inspiration. The
brain have, as a collective, some notoriously conflictive demands. On one side it need
to be "integrated" while must be able to stay "segregated", as discussed extensively by
Tononi and colleagues [27, 28]. This is a non trivial constraint, nevertheless mastered
by the brain as it is illustrated with plenty of neurobiological phenomenology. Suffice
to think in any conscious experience to immediately realize that always comprises a
single undecomposable scene [27], i.e., an integrated state. This integration is such
that once a cognitive event is committed, there is a refractory period (of about 150
msec.) in which nothing else can be though of. At the same time the large number of
conscious states that can be accessed over a short time interval exemplify very well the
segregation property. As an analogy, the integration property we are referring to could
be also interpreted as the capacity to act (and react) on an all-or-nothing mode, similar to
an action potential or a travelling wave in a excitable system. The segregation property
could be then visualized as the capacity to evoke equal or different all-or-nothing events
using different elements of the system. This could be more than a metaphor.
While the study of this problem is getting increasing attention, the mechanisms by
which this remarkable scenario can exist in the realms of brain physiology is not being
discussed as much as it should. Our approach is to look at the integration-segregation
dilemma as a generic property of dynamical systems at the critical point of a phase
transition. It is our suggestion that at the critical point these and others properties -
equally crucial for brain function- appear naturally. If the idea is correct, statistical
FIGURE 1. Representation of consciousness from the 17th century. The macroscopic phenomena, i.e.,
the imaginary, intellectual and sensory world and the respective brain areas remain at the same level of
description.
physics could help to move the current debate from phenomenology to understanding
of the lower level brain mechanisms of cognition.
What is special about being critical?
To visualize the potentially useful connections between brain function and ther-
modynamical systems at a phase transition it is helpful to recall the ferromagnetic-
paramagnetic phase transition illustrated in Figure 2. A material is ferromagnetic if it
displays a spontaneous magnetization in absence of any external magnetic field. If we
heat up an iron magnet the magnetization gets smaller and finally reaches zero. At low
temperature the system is very ordered with only very large domains of equally oriented
spins, a state that is practically invariant in time. On the other extreme, at very high
temperatures, spins orientation changes constantly, they are correlated at only very short
distances and as consequently the mean magnetization vanishes. In between these two
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FIGURE 2. Ferromagnetic-paramagnetic phase transition. Bottom: Temperature dependence of mag-
netization m(T) for Fe. Top three panels are snapshots of the spins configuration at one moment in time for
three temperatures: subcritical, critical and supercritical from numerical simulations of the Ising model
(d=2).
homogeneous states, at the critical temperature, the system exhibits very peculiar fluc-
tuations both in time and space. For example, the magnetization temporal fluctuations
are known to be scale invariant. Similarly, the spatial distribution of spins clusters show
long range (power law) correlations. At the critical point, these large dynamic structures
emerge, even though there are only short-range interactions between the systems ele-
ments. Thus, at the critical temperature, the system exhibits a greatly correlated (up to
the size of the system) state which at the same time is able to wildly fluctuate in time at
all scales. We propose that this dynamical scenario -generic for any second order phase
transition- is strikingly similar to the integrated-segregated dilemma discussed above
and shown to be relevant for the brain to operate as a conscious device. It is important
to note that there is no other conceivable dynamical scenario or robust attractor known
to exhibit these two properties simultaneously. Of course, any system could trivially
achieve integration and long range correlations in space by increasing link’s strength
among faraway sites, but these strong bonds would prevent any segregated state.
By considering the brain embedded in the rest of nature, one adopts the Darwinian
view that the brains we see today are the ones that -for whatever means- got an edge and
survived. Then we could ask how consistent is our view of the brain near a critical point
with these Darwinian constraints. We propose that the brains we see today are critical
because the world in which they have to survive is up to some degree critical as well.
If the world were sub-critical then everything would be simple and uniform (as in the
left panel of Figure 2) there would be nothing to learn, a brain will be superfluous. In
a supercritical world, everything would be changing all the time (as in the right panel
of Figure 2) it would be impossible to learn. Then we have to conclude that the brain
is only necessary to navigate in a complex, critical world. In other words we need a
brain because the world is critical [2, 3, 4, 9, 18]. Furthermore, a brain not only have
to remember, but also to forget and adapt. In a sub-critical brain memories would be
frozen. In a supercritical brain, patterns change all the time so no long term memory
would be possible. To be highly susceptible, the brain itself has to be in the in-between
critical state.
These ideas are not knew at all, indeed almost the same intuition prompted Turing
half a century ago to speculate about learning machines using similar terms:
Let us return for a moment to Lady Lovelace’s objection, which stated that
the machine can only do what we tell it to do. One could say that a man can
"inject" an idea into the machine, and that it will respond to a certain extent
and then drop into quiescence, like a piano string struck by a hammer. Another
simile would be an atomic pile of less than critical size: an injected idea is to
correspond to a neutron entering the pile from without. Each such neutron
will cause a certain disturbance which eventually dies away. If, however, the
size of the pile is sufficiently increased, tire disturbance caused by such an
incoming neutron will very likely go on and on increasing until the whole pile
is destroyed. Is there a corresponding phenomenon for minds, and is there one
for machines? There does seem to be one for the human mind. The majority
of them seem to be "subcritical," i.e., to correspond in this analogy to piles of
subcritical size. An idea presented to such a mind will on average give rise to
less than one idea in reply. A smallish proportion are supercritical. An idea
presented to such a mind that may give rise to a whole "theory" consisting
of secondary, tertiary and more remote ideas. Animals minds seem to be very
definitely subcritical. Adhering to this analogy we ask, "Can a machine be
made to be supercritical?"
How things stand today compared with Turing’s days? Very different, because of two
important aspects, the first one concerns with all the advances in monitoring brain signals
at different resolution and the second concerning the possibility to be guided by the last
two decades of results in critical phenomena.
What one should be able to observe?
A number of features, known to be exhibited by thermodynamic systems at the critical
point, should be immediately observed in brain experiments, including:
1. At large scale:
Cortical long range correlations in space and time.
Large scale anti-correlated cortical states.
2. At smaller scale:
"Neuronal avalanches", as the normal homeostatic state for most neocortical cir-
cuits.
"Cortical-quakes" continuously shaping the large scale synaptic landscape provid-
ing "stability" to the cortex.
3. At behavioral level:
All adaptive behavior should be "bursty" and apparently unstable, always at the
"edge of failing".
Life-long learning should be critical due to the effect of continuously "rising the
bar".
In addition one should be able to demonstrate that a brain behaving in a critical world
performs optimally at some critical point, thus confirming the intuition that the problem
can be better understood considering the environment in which brains evolved.
In the list above, the first item concerns the most elemental facts about critical phe-
nomena: despite the well known short range connectivity of the cortical columns, long
range structures appear and disappear continuously. The presence of inhibition as well
as excitation together with elementary stability constraints determine that cortical dy-
namics should exhibits large scale anti-correlated structures as well [15]. The features
at smaller scales could have been anticipated from theoretical considerations as well,
but avalanches were first observed empirically in cortical cultures and slices by Plenz
and colleagues [6]. An important point that is left to understand is how these quakes of
activity shape the neuronal synaptic profile during development. At the next level this
proposal suggests that human (and animal [7]) behavior itself should show indications
of criticality and learning also should be included. For example when teaching any skill
one chooses increasing challenge levels which are easy enough to engage the pupils but
difficult enough not to bores them. This "rising the bar" effect continues trough life,
pushing the learner continuously to the edge of failure! It would be interesting to mea-
sure some order parameter for sport performance to see if shows some of these features
for the most efficient teaching strategies.
RECENT RESULTS
Functional brain networks are complex
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) allows to monitor non invasively
spatio-temporal brain activity under various cognitive conditions. Recent work using this
imaging technique demonstrated complex functional networks of correlated dynamics
responding to the traffic between regions, during behavior or even at rest (see methods
in [14]. The data is analyzed in the context of the current understanding of complex
networks (for a review see [22]). During any given task the networks are constructed
first by calculating linear correlations between the time series of brain activity in each
of 36× 64× 64 brain sites. After that, links are said to exist between those brain sites
whose temporal evolutions are correlated beyond a pre-established value rc.
FIGURE 3. A typical brain network extracted from functional magnetic resonance imaging. Top panel
shows a pictorial representation of the network. The bottom panel shows the degree distribution for two
correlation thresholds rc. The inset depicts the degree distribution for an equivalent randomly connected
network. Data re-plotted from [14].
Figure 2, show a typical brain functional network extracted with this technique. The
top panel illustrates the interconnected network’s nodes and the bottom panel shows the
statistics of the number of links (i.e., the degree) per node. There is a few very well
connected nodes in one extreme and a great number of nodes with a single connection.
The typical degree distribution approaches a power law distribution with an exponent
around 2. Other measures revealed that the number of links as a function of -physical-
distance between brain sites also decays as a power law, something already confirmed
by others [21] using different techniques. Two statistical properties of these networks,
path length and clustering were computed as well. The path length (L) between two
voxels is the minimum number of links necessary to connect both voxels. Clustering (C)
is the fraction of connections between the topological neighbors of a voxel with respect
to the maximum possible. Measurements of L and C were also made in a randomized
version of the brain network. L remained relatively constant in both cases while C in the
random case resulted much smaller, implying that brain networks are "small world" nets,
a property with several implications in terms of cortical connectivity, as discussed further
in [24, 22]. In summary, the work in [14] showed that functional brain networks exhibit
highly inhomogeneous scale free functional connectivity with small world properties.
Although these results admit a few other interpretations, the long range correlations
demonstrated in these experiments are consistent with the picture of the brain operating
FIGURE 4. The size distribution of neuronal avalanches in mature cortical cultured networks follows
a power law with an exponent ∼ 3/2 (dashed line). The data, re-plotted from Figure 4 of [6], shows the
probability of observing an avalanche covering a given number of electrodes for three sets of grid sizes
shown in the insets with n=15, 30 or 60 sensing electrodes (equally spaced at 200µm). The statistics is
taken from data collected from 7 cultures in recordings lasting a total of 70 hours and accumulating 58000
(+− 55000) avalanches per hour (mean +− SD).
near a critical point. Of course, further experiments are needed to specifically define
and measure some order parameter to clarify the precise nature of these correlations.
Furthermore, as more detailed knowledge of the properties of these networks is achieved,
the need to integrate this data in a cohesive picture grows as discussed recently by Sporns
and colleagues [23].
Cortical networks exhibit neuronal avalanches
Recent experiments from Plenz and colleagues [6] were the first to demonstrate a
new type of small scale cortical activity. They showed that under some experimental
conditions, the cortex exhibits what they termed neuronal avalanches. This type of
population activity seats half way in between two well known patterns: the oscillatory
or wave-like highly coherent activity on one side and the asynchronic and uncoherent
modality on the other. In each avalanche neuronal activity have a very large probability
to engage few neurons and die, and a very low probability to spread and activate the
whole system. In very elegant experiments Plenz and colleagues estimated a number
of properties indicatives of critical behavior including a power law with an exponent
∼ 3/2 for the density of avalanche sizes (see Figure 4). This agrees exactly with the
theoretical expectation for a critical branching process [31]. Further experiments in
other experimental settings, including monkey and rats in vivo recordings, have already
confirmed and expanded these initial estimations [19, 25]. An unsolved problem here
is to elucidate the precise neuronal mechanisms leading to this behavior. Avalanches
of activity such as the one observed by Plenz and colleagues could be the reflection of
completely different scenarios. It could reflects a structural (i.e., anatomical) substrate
over which travelling waves in the peculiar form of avalanches occur. This will imply
that the long range correlations detected are trivially due to long range connections. If
that is the case, as was discussed above, this have nothing to do with criticality, and
furthermore it will imply that segregation will be impossible. The second possibility is
that avalanches occurs over a population of locally connected neurons. Their ongoing
collective history will permanently keep them near the border of avalanching and each
avalanche will only excite enough neurons to dissipate the excess of activity. Although
this is the most likely scenario, which follows the ideas and results put forward by Bak
and colleagues [2, 3, 4, 9, 18], there is much theoretical work awaiting to formalize these
results.
McCulloch already saw it in 1940
Dusser de Barenne, Warren McCulloch and colleagues [17, 13], more than sixty years
ago, experimented inducing local seizures by instillating drops of strychnine in several
regions of the monkey cortex while recording cortical electrical activity simultaneously
in twenty sites across the entire cortex. This clever technique, mastered by Dusser de
Barenne, received the name of strychnine neuronography. In a certain way, these exper-
iments could be considered the earliest attempt to study brain functional connectivity,
by inducing some liminal activity in a given area and recording the co-active cortical
sites. Typically, they noticed that the initial activity induced by the strychnine remained
local, and did not generalized to the entire cortex. However with surprise they noted
that, less often, the activity was recorded in very far away locations. Figure 5 (redrawn
from the original sketches in [5]) summarizes these early observations together with our
own rough estimations in Panel D. Filled circles in Panel D represent the distribution
of edge lengths, computed from the drawing in Panel A as the Euclidean distance (us-
ing arbitrary units) between the location of each strychnine instillation and the resulting
activation site/s. Note that, despite the scarcity of the data, the results demonstrate long
range correlations, the exponent being similar to the estimations using fMRI [14, 21].
For example an application in the frontal cortex induced activity sometimes in the oc-
cipital cortex. Nowadays, is not difficult to admit that frontal activation will evoke visual
imaginery and viceversa, however McCulloch knew that much before us.
Senses are critical
In more than one sense our senses seems to be critical. To move around, to escape
from predators, to choose a mate or to find food, the sensory apparatus is critical for any
animal survival. But it seems that senses are also critical in the thermodynamic sense
of the world. Consider first the fact that the density distribution of the various form
of energy around us is clearly inhomogeneous, at any level of biological reality, from
the sound loudness any animal have to adapt to the amount of rain a vegetal have to
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FIGURE 5. McCulloch experiments inducing local seizures by instillation of strychnine. Panel A and
B are from chimpanzee experiments [5]. Panel A shows a summary of the sites where the strychnine was
applied (filled circled) and the sites of the cortex fired by the topical application. Besides the local ones,
long range activations crossing the entire cortex were often observed. Panel B illustrates the adjacency
matrix summarizing which areas -on the average- were activated by the strychnine application. Panel C
shows similar results obtained by McCulloch and colleagues in Macaca Mulata [17] mapping the entire
cortex and basal ganglia. Panel D depicts (note the double logarithmic axis) the edge length density
distribution computed from McCulloch’s drawing in Panel A. The dashed line with slope 2 illustrates,
for comparison, the average edge-length density found in recent fMRI experiments [14].
take advantage. From the extreme darkness of a deep cave to the brightest flash of light
there are several order of magnitude changes, nevertheless our sensory apparatus is able
to inform the brain of such changes. It is well known that isolated neurons are unable
to do that because of their limited dynamic range, which spans only a single order of
magnitude. This is the oldest unsolved problem in the field of psychophysics, tackled
very recently by Kinouchi and Copelli [16] by showing that the dynamics emerging
from the interaction of coupled excitable elements is the key to solve the problem. Their
results show that a network of excitable elements set precisely at the edge of a phase
transition - or, at criticality - can be both, extremely sensitive to small perturbations
and still able to detect large inputs without saturation. This is generic for any networks
regardless of the neurons’ individual sophistication. The key aspect in the model is a
local parameter that control the amplification of any initial firing activity. Whenever
the average amplification is very small activity dies out; the model is subcritical and not
sensitive to small inputs. On the other hand, choosing an amplification very large one sets
up the conditions for a supercritical reaction in which for any - even very small - inputs
the entire network fires. It is only in between these two extremes that the networks have
the largest dynamic range. Thus, amplification around unity, i.e., at criticality, seems to
be the optimum condition for detecting large energy changes as an animal encounters
in the real world [11]. It is only in a critical world that energy is dissipated as a fractal
in space and time with the characteristic highly inhomogeneous fluctuations. Since the
world around us appears to be critical, it seems that we, as evolving organisms embedded
in it, have no better choice than to be the same.
OUTLOOK
The preceding section purposely presented only a selection of concrete results inspired
in the approach promoted here. They do not probe that the brain is critical, but they
demonstrate that there are relevant aspects of brain dynamics which underlying collec-
tive is critical in some sense. There are, of course, an increasingly large body of work
modelling and explaining further these experimental findings, which we will not enu-
merate, because this is not an exhaustive review. An excellent survey is in press and
we direct the readers to it [20]. Nevertheless we mention, mostly as a guide for further
reading, ideas connected with the general framework discussed here. Probably the first
to note should be Ashby’s work to understand how the forces of self-organization could
shape a brain [1]. The work of Tononi, Edelman and colleagues [26, 27] it is the first
to delineate the fundamental problem of integration and segregation and to explore its
connection with complexity. The analysis of cortical coordination dynamics discussed
by Kelso, Bressler and colleagues [8], are related with this proposal, because it main in-
gredients, collective variables, and metastable coordination states are all generic of the
critical state discussed here. Of note also is Dehaene [12] "workspace" model of con-
scious experience that resemble the scale free distribution of hubs observed experimen-
tally and discussed above. Most probably a detailed analysis of their specific numerical
models would reveal optimum performance near criticality, something worth to pursue.
Finally, there is the exhaustive review of Werner [30] advocating to further the study of
phase transitions, metastability and criticality in cognitive models and experiments.
The main difference that set apart this proposal from all of the above efforts, is that
it does not pretend to be novel or ad hoc. Right or wrong, but deliberately, the proposal
is that relevant aspects of brain dynamics can be understood using the same theoretical
framework as for any nonequilibrium thermodynamic system at or near the critical point
of a second order phase transition.
Arguably, brain theory is still at a stage comparable to physics in "pre-
thermodynamic" times. Imagine yourself in days previous to the notion of temperature.
Similarities between scalding water and ice will be supported by their similar "burning"
(to the touch) properties, when hot or cold were only subjective quantities. Of course,
the notion of pressure and temperature together with phases changed everything. Brain
theory will eventually undergo such transformation starting with the preliminary defi-
nition of order parameters such as Tononi’s Φ [28] and the elaboration of some phase
diagram, including degrees of consciousness, modalities of transitions between phases,
etc. Until then, pre-thermodynamic debates will surely continue.
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